BOOK REVIEWS
The Paradoxes of Freedom. By SIDNrY HOOK. Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1962. Pp. xi, 152. $4.95.
Professor Paul Freund once observed that "to understand the Supreme
Court of the United States is a theme that forces lawyers to become philosophers."' It appears that the theme also compels philosophers to become lawyers. The ParadoxesofFreedom, a large part of which is devoted to the problem of understanding the Supreme Court and its work, is not philosopher
Sidney Hook's first foray into constitutional law nor, it is to be hoped, his
last, but only his latest. The three theses that he develops in this volume,
based on his Jefferson Memorial Lectures at the University of California, are:
(1) the philosophical, logical, practical and legal inadequacies of the "absolutist" positions reflected by Mr. Justice Black, 2 Professor Charles L. Black, Jr.,3
and Dr. Alexander Meildejohn, 4 the last another philosopher concerned with
the constitutional meaning of the Bill of Rights; (2) the inconsistency between the Court's power of judicial review and democracy; and (3) the inconsistency between the right of revolution and democracy. It is a stimulating
book with some of which everyone will agree; with all of which no one will
agree.
Were it not for the great distinction of the men who have lent their names
to "absolutist" theory, I should have said that Professor Hook's first chapter was devoted to thrashing a straw man. Indeed, by Professor Black's
own admission, the pretence to absolutism is merely rhetorical. 5 But Professor
Black cannot be treated as the authoritative spokesman for the cause. For
example, in 1961, Professor Black announced: "No one would argue... that
. . . 'free speech'.., includes mere personal slander... "6 Only one year
later, Mr. Justice Black asserted: "I have no doubt myself that the provision,
as written and adopted, intended that there should be no libel or defamation
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7
law in the United States... just absolutely none so far as I am concerned."
But, perhaps, Mr. Justice Black, too, however authoritative his voice, speaks
only for himself, for in the same interview in which he contradicted Professor
Black he rejected Dr. Meiklejohn.8 It may well be true, therefore, that Professor Hook is dealing with a mythical enemy insofar as he talks of an "absolutist" position rather than a plethora of views that may be treated under this
shibboleth. But Hook not only puts forth arguments in contradiction of the
positions actually taken by the absolutists, he makes out an affirmative case
for the "balancers."
Despite the repeated charge by Mr. Justice Black that those who would
reject the absolutist position must resort to natural law to resolve constitutional problems of civil liberties, it is clear that Hook falls outside the category
of natural law adherents. His intellectual predecessors are Hobbes, the early
Hume, Bentham, and Dewey, rather than Aquinas. His essential premise is
that intelligence and reason are the only valid guides; there is no other source
for adequate evaluation. All "rights" must be justified by a "reflective judgment that some shared goal, purpose, or need-some shared interest, want, or
feeling-requires the functioning presence of these rights."9 Moreover, there
can be no valid abstraction such as "freedom." The right to a freedom "cannot
be determined unless the freedom demanded is specified and considered in a
concrete social and historical context."io Thus, changing'social conditions require the creation of new rights and the destruction of old ones. (No demonstration of this proposition is more concrete than the Supreme Court's decision in the School Segregation Cases, with which even the most ardent absolutists must concur despite the absence of literal authority in the Constitution.) As a matter of logic," as a matter of ethics,' 2 as a matter of experience,13
"freedoms" thus created will necessarily conflict with each other: "there
simply cannot be two absolute rights if they can conceivably conflict."1 4 To
treat each of them as absolutes is to make impossible the resolution of conflicts among them. Which shall give way to another must be determined in
each specific case by an intelligent appraisal determining which will provide
the greater utilitarian benefit to society.
When Professor Hook comes to deal with specific constitutional problems,
most of what he has to say is unassailable proof of his own position, and of the
fallacies of the absolutist positions. But he weakens his case somewhat by
resorting to some classic examples that are not necessarily useful to his posi7 Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 549, 557 (1962). A most convincing refutation of Mr. Justice Black's historical position
is to be found in LEVY, LEGACY OF SuPPREssIoN: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN EARLY AMERICAN
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tion. Let me suggest two such instances. The first is his demonstration that
freedom of religion does not extend to all practices required by religious
sects; for example, bigamy commanded by religious beliefs may be punished
despite the requirement of the first amendment that "Congress shall make no
law... prohibiting the free exercise" of "religion."' 5 From this he would
show that the first amendment does not mean that "Congress shall make no
law," but rather implies that "Congress may make some law" that might be
an inhibition on freedom of religion where circumstances warrant. The difficulty of using the freedom of religion clause as a measure of the scope of the
other freedoms specifically guaranteed by the Bill of Rights is that the Constitution itself provides a qualification on the freedom of religion clause in its
specification of the separation clause. When the two religion clauses are read
together rather than separately, as they should be,16 a different standard is
provided for problems of religious freedom than for those rights arising under
other constitutional provisions. It is not helpful, therefore, to attack the absolutist position by proving the non-existence of absolute rules derived from the
freedom of religion clause.
The second of Professor Hook's examples that troubles me refers to the
potential conflict between the right to freedom of the press and the right to a
fair trial:
What does the Constitution tell us to do in the event that the fair trial
requirements of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment conflict with the free
speech protection of the First-a not infrequent occurrence? When does
free speech about a trial make an individual liable to contempt of court,
when not? It is not the Constitution which tells the judge when speech or
publication constitutes contempt of court but the circumstances of the case
read in the light of an informed intelligence. Sometimes the judge sacrifices
the rights of a defendant-to a degree quite shocking to the moral sensibilities of our British cousins-because of the importance of the public's right
to know. Sometimes he fines or jails the enterprising reporter and publisher
17
despite their shrill cries about freedom of speech.
I have two difficulties with this example, however much I may agree with
the position suggested. The absolutist, who is a literalist, may validly assert
that the language of the first amendment specifically prohibits infringement of
the freedom of the press; the fifth and sixth amendments do not specifically
provide for a right to a fair trial but only specify some of the attributes of a
fair trial plus the amorphous right to due process of law. Therefore, they
might say that there is no conflict of absolutes at all. (Presumably, they would
not go so far as to say that the first amendment limits the power of the legislature to infringe freedom of speech and press, but not the power of the courts
to do so.) On the basis of recent Supreme Court decisions, as distinguished
15
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from the language therein, the absolutist proposition could be sustained. In
these cases the Court has consistently preferred the right of the press where
the question has arisen in a review of contempt proceedings.18 More important, perhaps, is the fact that it is possible to reconcile these two "absolutes"
by precluding trial of the newspapers for contempt and reversing criminal
convictions where the trial has been improperly affected by newspaper publicity, thus vindicating both the right to freedom of the press and the right to a
fair trial.19 And there is much to be said for this resolution of the problem, so
long as the tainting newspaper story is the result of press releases and statements issuing from the prosecutor's office. Such a rule might have a desirably
inhibiting effect on the prevalent tendency of prosecutors to try their cases in
the newspapers. But where the fault does not lie with the prosecutor-and
there are other ways of curbing him-the price of multiple trials may be
unduly burdensome both to the government and the defendant. Indeed, the
burden of a second trial on the defendant, even where the prosecutor is at
fault, might alone justify a resolution of the conflict in the manner suggested
by Professor Hook. All that can be said for this conclusion has been said by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Bridges, Pennekamp, and Craig,20 and in Maryland
v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. 21
Except for details such as those specified, the presentation by Hook of the
case against the absolutists seems to me to be conclusive. Even if the adherents
to the doctrine attacked are small in number, the book is valuable as an excellent brief against the cause and should help to prevent the doctrine from
spreading among those who are willing to think about it.

Professor Hook's second essay is less cogent. His proposition is that the
Supreme Court's power of judicial review, because it is inconsistent with democracy, must be shackled by a requirement of unanimity. Absent a unanimous Court, its majority conclusion that legislation is unconstitutional should
be ignored. His premise is not that the American Constitution demands a
perfect democracy in the sense that all citizens must assume direct responsibility for the conduct of the government. This would be an ideal to which no government, with the possible exception of the New England town meeting, has
aspired, although the Greek city-states are often said to have achieved such
Olympian heights.22 Although, as Hook concedes, "many have been the
18 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
19 Cf.Black, supra note 7, at 555-56.
20 Sipra note 18.
21338 U.S. 912 (1950).
22
"We often hear it laid down as an axiom that Greek democracy differs from modem
because it did not use the representative principle. This is of course a complete mistake....
No state has ever been composed of citizens all of whom have the leisure or desire or the
knowledge to attend to public affairs. The Greek City State differs from our modem democracies in enlisting not all but merely a far larger proportion of its representatives in active
public work." ZnamMRN, Tim GREEK CommoNwEALTH 158 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1956).
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meanings given to the word 'democracy' in the history of thought,"23 if his
thesis is to be accepted, the reader must acquiesce in Hook's own definition:
No democracy can exist which does not recognize the responsibility of
governmental power to the adult citizens affected by its decisions. This responsibility requires the operating presence, not paper indication, of
mechanisms of freely given consent and control. By virtue of their operation, the dominant trends of public opinion about general or specific questions of public welfare determine public policy.24
Throughout this chapter he indicates that the "responsibility" of which he
writes must flow directly from the governmental body to the people. At least
in the case of the Court, the indirect controls, that of the legislature over the
Court's jurisdiction, the power of the legislature to authorize additional appointments, the President's power of appointment, the people's power of constitutional amendment, even considered cumulatively rather than separately,
do not satisfy Hook's demands.
Not only do you have to accept Hook's definition of democracy but also his
definition of judicial review: "by judicial review I shall refer only to the power
of the United States Supreme Court to nullify Congressionallegislation and
Executive action, and not to its function as a supreme court in the national
system of law which of necessity entails the power to override state legislatures ..."25 While this distinction between review of state action and review
of federal action may reasonably be derived from the supremacy clause, so
that, as a matter of construction, it can be said that the Constitution authorizes judicial review of state action only, the distinction can hardly rest on the
proposition that with reference to the national government the Court's power
is undemocratic but with reference to state action it'conforms to Hook's demands for democracy. If it is unresponsive to the popular will in the first instance, it is equally unresponsive in the second. It would be interesting to learn
how Professor Hook would resolve this paradox of his own creation, but such
explanation is not forthcoming in this volume.
Equally difficult to understand is his proposal to require a unanimous Court
to declare unconstitutional action of the national government (and even this to
be subject to revision by a two-thirds vote of the legislature). Certainly this
requirement would be a serious limitation on the powers of the Court. It is
true, of course, that such a requirement would enhance the power of the legislative and executive branches of government vis-4-vis the judiciary. But it does
not make the Court's action more democratic, i.e., more directly responsive to
the mandate of the people. (Incidentally, it does not explain how the federal
trial and intermediate appellate courts are to act under the circumstances.) In
fact, only two possible amendments of the judicial power would really satisfy
Hook's thesis: direct election of the Justices and abolition of the power of
23 p. 63.
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judicial review. The perils and costs of each of these apparently provide sufficient reason for Hook not to have chosen them; they do not explain his
choice.
The real defect in Hook's argument is his refusal to recognize that the
judiciary's responsibility to the electorate differs from that of the executive and
legislative branches only in degree and not in kind. None of the three branches
is directly responsible in the sense that he would have them be. All three are
responsive to the expression of an aroused public opinion, including the
Court. 26 And, if the Court is least responsive, it must be recognized that it is
also the least powerful of the three, "the least dangerous branch," as it was
termed by The Federalistand more recently by Professor Bickel in his book
2
bearing that title. 7
All of this leads me to prefer Judge Hand's conclusion 28 to that of Professor
Hook. The power ofjudicial review should be exercised by the Court but only
with the greatest restraint. Hook's opinion that self-restraint is no restraint
can only be countered by the contradictory opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who has shouldered the burdens of judicial office on the High Court
and demonstrated that such restraint can be real. 29
Professor Hook's third subject is one that departs from the realm of constitutional law. His proposition is that there is a "right" to use force for purposes of revolution only where the government is not a democracy. Where the
would-be revolutionary is in a democratic country, he is free only to utilize
peaceful means of resistance to government demands, and he must willingly
accept the punishment for all such actions as violate the law. I find it difficult
to believe that there is a rational method of delimiting the "right to revolution." Like the "laws of war," it is, for me, an anomalous concept, for revolution, like war, is essentially lawless. Given this bias, which Hook did not dissipate, I must leave the reader to discover for himself whether the "proof" is
adequate to support his thesis.
26 See TOCQUEVILLE, DEmOCRACY IN AMERiCA 151 (Bradley ed. 1945).
27

BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).

28 See HAND, THE BILL oF RiGHTs (1958).
29 See, e.g., Frankfurter, JohnMarshalland the JudicialFunction,in GOaysm MNT UNDER
LAW 6 (1956); MENDELSON, JuSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE COURT

(1961).
In his reply to the letter of the other Justices on his retirement, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
also refuted some of the allegations made by Hook: "The nature of the issues which are
involved in the legal controversies that are inevitable under our constitutional system does
not warrant the nation to expect identity of views among the members of the Court regarding
such issues, nor even agreement on the routes of thought by which decisions are reached.
The nation is merely warranted in expecting harmony of aims among those who have
been called to the Court. This means pertinacious pursuit of the processes of Reason in the
disposition of the controversies that come before the Court. This presupposes intellectual
disinterestedness in the analysis of the factors involved in the issues that call for decision.
This in turn requires rigorous self-scrutiny to discover, with a view to curbing, every influence that may deflect from such disinterestedness." 83 Sup. Ct. xvii.
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In conclusion, I would say that I agree with Hook's first argument, I disagree with his second, and I am unable to reach a conclusion on his third. But
I think that all three are valuable aids toward rational consideration of problems that are more or less lively political issues of the day. I can heartily recommend this volume to all who seek the help of the mind to resolve questions
too frequently ignored by the intellect and resolved by emotion. All three essays stimulate thought, and no more should be demanded of any author.

PILIP B.
* Professor
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of Law, The University of Chicago.

Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends. By Orro
KiRcHHmmMR. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. Pp. xiv, 452.
$8.50.
What is Political Justice? In a sense all administration of justice, criminal
and civil, is political, as it serves to maintain and at times to change, the social
and political order of society. Kirchheimer deals with political justice in its
more specific sense-the use of the law and the courts directly to influence the
struggle for political power. Even in this narrower sense the term refers to a
wide variety of phenomena, ranging from the judicial prosecution of the alleged revolutionary or traitor to the use of the courts by the political opponent
who forces a member of the governing group into a defamation suit. This
variety of forms in which political justice can appear is vividly illustrated by
the author in the opening chapter of his book, in which he presents a concise
historical survey and a detailed description of some typical political cases of
recent times. The use of an accusation of common crime to discredit or destroy
a political opponent is illustrated by the attempt of the Kentucky Democrats
in the 1890's to wrest the governorship from the Republicans by preferring a
specious murder charge against the Republican leaders. The story of this long
forgotten, but by no means atypical, episode of American politics is instructive as well as thrilling. The equally specious, but successful, attempt of
Clemenceau and Poincar6, through a treason charge to prevent Caillaux from
attaining political power during World War I, and from using it to bring
about a compromise peace, stands for what may be called political justice in its
purest form. How a regime can be undermined by forcing a member of the
governing group to defend himself against libelous charges before a judiciary
sympathetic to the libellant's cause is demonstrated by the case of Friedrich
Ebert, first President of the German Republic after the collapse of the
monarchy.
While trial can thus serve as a weapon of attack, it is more frequently a
weapon to defend an existing regime or government against its opponents.
Political justice is a typical weapon of what Kirchheimer calls "state protec-

